Political budget cycle models have been widely tested, but few studies consider different institutional contexts and different categories of public spending. This paper uses data on disaggregated expenditures to estimate the effects of balanced budget requirements on electoral cycles. Using data of American states from 1977 to 2008, the analysis finds, that prior to gubernatorial elections, politicians are likely to shift public spending toward more salient projects, such as corrections, security and welfare expenditure, and away from education expenditure. This finding is consistent with the prediction of Rogoff and Sibert's signaling model (1988). Yet, such effects are only significant in states with carry-over fiscal rules, and are dampened by more stringent fiscal rules. Thus, balanced budget requirements constrain politicians ability to shift spending across different categories. Without considering the balanced budget requirement, the effects of political budget cycles may be overstated.
Introduction
Balanced budget requirements, rules that require a balance between the projected receipts and expenditures of the government, have been widely adopted in many countries. For example, one of the important criteria of the Maastricht Treaty 1 , the Treaty of the European Union, is that the annual government deficit must be not higher than 3% of GDP and that the national debt must be lower than 60% of GDP at the end of the preceding fiscal year. Balanced budget provisions have also been added to the constitutions of Spain, Italy and most U.S. states. Several studies attempt to empirically assess the average effectiveness of balanced budget requirements in enforcing budget discipline. The empirical literature focusing on the fiscal rules of U.S. states suggests that balanced budget requirements that prohibit and limit what deficits can be carried over to the next fiscal year are substantially effective in enforcing fiscal balance (Rose 2006 ). However, little of the literature focuses on the speculative behavior of politicians and their ability to engage in fiscal manipulation under different types of rules. Even though fiscal rules may limit politicians ability to manipulate the aggregate budget, they could instead manipulate the composition of public expenditure for electoral gain, allowing overall spending to remain unchanged. So, this paper aims to examine the association between changes in public-spending composition and balanced budget requirements.
Many papers regarding political business cycles and political budget cycles study the incentives for politicians' behavior prior to the election to maximize electoral gains. Traditional political budget cycle models suggest that opportunistic incumbent politicians defer tax increases or expand public spending prior to elections in order to induce economic expansion and increase their chances of being reelected (Drazen, 2001 ). So, fiscal deficits are likely to be higher in election years and lower in non-election years. All these studies implicitly presume that politicians are allowed to run budget deficits. Yet in fact, balanced budget requirements or fiscal controls may constrain politicians abilities to manipulate fiscal policies and then affect the electoral cycles. Few of the studies consider the different institutional contexts and their effect on political cycles and spending composition. To complement the existing literatures, this paper goes beyond the work on traditional political budget cycles focusing mainly on aggregate government spending, by using data on disaggregated expenditure composition to estimate the effects of balanced budget requirements on political cycles.
To compare the effect on electoral cycles of different fiscal rules, data from the American states constitutes an excellent laboratory: 27 out of 50 states have no carry-over fiscal rules, with deficits prohibited, and 22 out of 50 states have limited carry-over fiscal rules, where unanticipated deficits are permitted. Vermont is the only exception, having no restrictions. A conjecture is that with stringent fiscal rules, prior to gubernatorial elections politicians will be induced to shift public spending towards more salient projects to increase electoral gain, so that the effect of the electoral cycles on compositional changes in public spending will be observable. Such an effect would be lessened for a government with limited carry-over fiscal rules, because the politicians in those states can also manipulate the aggregate budget. 2 In addition, the paper looks at the effect of partisanship on the composition of public expenditure over the political cycle. According to Hibb's partisan approach (1977) , parties have different positions on economic issues, so that differing positions of Democratic and Republican governors may affect the nature of the electoral cycles. The paper also investigates the impact of political institutions on electoral cycles, in particular the presence of gubernatorial term limits. Besley and Case's reputation-building model (1995) suggests that governors who do not face a binding term limit care more about their reputations and hence act more often in the voters' interest. Thus, governors who face a binding term limit and those who do not may behave differently and have different preferences regarding government expenditure composition. 2 Rose(2006) finds a significant effect of political budget cycles in states with limited carry-over fiscal rules, but not in states with stringent no carry-over fiscal rules. Her work suggests that stringent balanced budget requirements limit politicians' ability to manipulate the aggregate budget.
Review of the Literature on Political Budget Cycles
In recent years, large numbers of studies aim to investigate the empirical relationship between macroeconomic conditions and election outcomes. These studies share a common theme based on political business cycle models. There are two theoretical approaches. The first one is the opportunistic approach developed by Nordhaus (1975) . It states that office-motivated politicians manipulate government policies prior to elections in order to increase vote shares and their chances of being reelected. The other approach is the partisan approach (Hibb 1977), which assumes that different party positions on economic issues translate into different policies and thus different effects on the economy. The main implications of political business cycle models have been widely tested 3 .
Political budget cycles suggest that opportunistic incumbent politicians manipulate fiscal policy to defer tax increases or expand public spending prior to elections in order to induce economic expansion and increase their chances of being reelected. Many empirical studies have been devoted to finding evidence of such political budget cycles by measuring changes in aggregate public spending, revenue and fiscal deficits prior to an election. However, the empirical results are not clear, so that the view that increasing public spending or cutting taxes before an election are effective ways to garner voters support has been questioned. One of the arguments is that political budget cycles are inconsistent with the concept of rational and forward-looking voters (Mccallum 1978) . Under the assumption of rational expectations, politicians expect that, if they were to attempt to please voters by fiscal policies, voters would quickly see through these manipulative policies and realize that budget deficits are costly and they will need to pay back after the election. Thus, politicians know that voters are not fooled, so that they would not attempt to manipulate expenditures and taxes. In addition, voters may be fiscally conservative, disliking budget deficits, so they will punish election-year deficit spending at the polls instead of rewarding it (Pelzman 1992, Brender and Drazen 2008). Recently, some studies characterize democracies and non-democracies at all levels of economic development and find that political budget cycles are more prominent in developing countries (Brender and Drazen 2005, Shi and Svensson 2006). This evidence suggests that voters in advanced democracies are well informed about fiscal outcomes and also more experienced with electoral politics, making them less likely to be "fooled" by pre-electoral fiscal manipulation.
To reconcile fiscal manipulation prior to elections with voter rationality, Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Drazen and Eslave (2005) suggest that incumbents have an incentive to influence voters by changing the composition of government spending, rather than aggregate spending and revenues. Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990) design a signaling model in which, due to information asymmetries, voters can only observe the capital spending with a one period lag. Incumbents not only have a temporary information advantage about their level of competency 3 The empirical results of political business cycle models are mixed. Nordhaus (1975) looks at annual unemployment data from 1947 to 1972 and finds that political business cycle models fit Germany, New Zealand and the United States data, but are rejected in cases of many other countries. Alesina and Roubini (1990) test PBC models in 18 OECD economies from 1960 to 1987 and find no evidence of a statistically significant increase in economic activity before elections. Considering the endogeneity of election timing, Cargill and Hutchison (1991) find that, in the post-war period, the timing of Japanese elections significantly influences the path of real GNP growth.
but also have private information about the amount of capital spending, so that observed pre-election consumption expenditure serves as a signal of the incumbents' competence. The separating equilibrium shows that competent incumbents have an incentive to manipulate fiscal policy to shift public expenditure to more visible projects and away from longer-term investment projects in election years, whereas incompetent incumbents will reveal their true types. Their model sheds light on the importance of "visibility" in influencing incumbents' policy preferences and government resource allocation during the election year. Some empirical findings both in developing countries and developed countries are consistent with the predictions of the signaling model. Vergne (2009) In contrast to the signaling model, Drazen and Eslave (2005) develop a targeting model in which, even if voters are able to observe incumbents fiscal policies without a one period lag, fully rational voters will still allow pre-election manipulation in public-spending composition. The assumption behind this model is that voters value some types of public goods more than others, and therefore they care about the preferences of incumbents over the mix of public goods. Due to the persistence of fiscal policies, pre-election fiscal manipulation by incumbents helps voters make inferences about incumbents' fiscal policy preferences after being elected. So, prior to the election, incumbents have incentives to increase public spending to targeted expenditures and move away from non-targeted expenditures. Targeted expenditures are more likely to take the form of infrastructure and development projects such as the construction of the roads, mass transportation and schools, because they are easier to target to particular constituencies by geography (Vergne 2009 ). By studying the behavior of voters in Colombian municipalities, Drazen and Eslave (2005) find a decrease in some current expenditures, such as transfers to retirees and payment to temporary workers, and an increase in development projects, including road construction and construction of power and water plants.
To sum up, the signaling model suggests that, rather than favoring capital expenditure prior to elections, politicians increase current expenditures, which provide immediate economic benefits to voters, in exchange for political support. The targeting model instead predicts that opportunistic politicians will expand targeted expenditures, particularly infrastructure and development expenditures, to convince voters of their policy credibility in the future. However, both of these arguments do not take into consideration the effect of balanced budget requirements on electoral cycles. Before examining this association, overview of balanced budget requirements in the American states is needed.
Institutional background: Balanced Budgets in U.S. State Government
Balancing the budget is a major goal of state policy and politics. Forty-nine of the fifty states (Vermont is the exception) have constitutional or statutory limitation constraining politicians' ability to run fiscal deficits on the general fund budget, into which most state tax collections are deposited and from which most discretionary appropriations are made. These rules were included in the original state constitutions or approved by the legislature and developed as statutory constraints (Bohn and Inman 1996, Rose 2006 ). According to Bohn and Inman (1996) , balanced budget requirements can be grouped into two broad categories. The first category is a carry-over fiscal rule: the states impose prospective restrictions instead of retrospective restrictions on the budget. The governors are required to submit a balanced budget or the state legislatures are required to pass a balanced budget at the beginning of the fiscal year. In other words, because there is no restriction on the balance of the budget at the end of the fiscal year, the states are allowed to run unanticipated deficits. The second category rules out carry-overs: the states impose both prospective and retrospective restrictions on the budget. The governments are not allowed to carry over the deficit into the next fiscal year. If these limits are about to be violated, the deficit must be eliminated through accounting adjustment, by rolling their deficits into next fiscal year, or through real adjustment by spending cuts, tax increases, borrowing, or fiscal gimmicks.
Several studies test the effect of the stringency of fiscal rules on fiscal policies and financial performance. 4 Yet few studies focus on the degree of fiscal manipulation under different type of rules. Hou and Smith (2010) find evidence that states with more stringent fiscal rules are more likely to balance their budgets. So, it is not surprising that stringent balanced budget rules may counter political budget cycles. Using data on aggregate spending from 1974 to 1999, Rose (2006) finds that, fiscal rules dampen electoral cycles and limit politicians' ability to manipulate the aggregate budget. However, if state fiscal rules were endogenously determined by constituency characteristics or states with the same fiscal rules share some common unobservable factors, which are correlated with state fiscal rules, this result may be biased. For example, states with no carry-over rules are located disproportionately in the Midwest and South. It is possible that voters in these states share the common value of fiscal conservatism, so that politicians know that manipulating aggregate budget brings them no electoral gains. In this case, the estimates of the election effects biased downward. The effects of electoral cycles may be mainly driven by voters characteristics, instead of balanced budget requirements. Without breaking down aggregate spending, it is difficult to purify the effect of balanced budget restrictions. Thus, instead of focusing on aggregate spending, this paper aims to study changes in public-spending composition over the electoral cycles.
Data Description and Resources
The paper intends to explore the existence of electoral cycles in different public spending categories, and whether or not the magnitude of effects varies across types of fiscal rules. The empirical work uses data for forty-six states from 1977 to 2008. 5 New Hampshire and Vermont are omitted, because governors of these two states serve terms of two years. Alaska and Wyoming are omitted because they are fiscal outliers, with extraordinarily large general fund surpluses per capita due to severance taxes on oil. The dependent variables, state public expenditures on different categories, are obtained from U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Survey of State and Local Government Finances and Census of Governments. Each category of expenditure includes the amount of money paid out by the state government during the fiscal year. The survey year of most of the states in the sample runs from July 1 of the previous year to June 30 of the survey year. The exceptions are Alabama, Michigan (both from October 1 of the previous year to September 30 of the survey year) and Texas (from September 1 of the previous year to August 31 of the survey year). Since most of the gubernatorial elections are held near the end of the calendar year, for all these states the calendar years match the fiscal years. The other exception is New York, where the survey year runs from April 1 of the previous year to March 31 of the survey year, so the fiscal years are matched by the next calendar years. In addition, all the fiscal data is in current dollars, with figures put in real terms using the Consumer Price Index of all items for all Urban Consumers, index 1980=100, from FRED (Federal Reserved Economic Data).
Categorization of the types of fiscal rules follows Bohn and Inman (1996), Rose (2006) and the ACIR stringency index 6 constructed by the Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations (1987), with small revisions. 7 Based on Rose (2006) , in states with stringent no carryover fiscal rules, borrowing is difficult either because borrowing is prohibited or a referendum borrowing constraint is applied. In states with weak no carry-over fiscal rules, short-term public debt can be issued by the governor, the legislature, or a public official. In the sample, seventeen states have carry-over rules (including California prior to 2004); thirty states have no carry-over rules (including California after 2004). Among the states with no carry-over rules, eleven of them are weak in form and nineteen are stringent.
Apart from the fiscal variables, control variables are demographic and structural indicators from U.S. Census Bureau, such as population age composition, unemployment rate, income, and lagged interest expenditure on the general debt. It should be noted that, every year, the federal government transfers reimbursements or grants in aid to a state for specific purposes, with the state government having little discretion over the use of this federal money. Due to data limitations, separating out state outlays that the state government can fully controlled is difficult. Therefore, it is assumed that all funds from intergovernmental transfer (IGR) from the federal government are not under state control. The last step is construction of the electoral data, including electoral year, divided government 8 , Democratic governor 9 , and term limits 10 . Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the sample. From Table 1 , states with carry-over rules are more populous and have higher per capita incomes than states without such rules. In addition, states with carry-over rules are disproportionately located in the West and Northeast, whereas states with no carry-over rules tend to be located in the Midwest and South. It is not surprising that states with carry-over rules enjoy higher public spending, and receive higher intergovernmental transfer from the federal government. State government spending falls in four major categories: education, health, transportation and welfare expenditure. During each fiscal year, the federal government transfers money to state governments targeting these four categories; the summary statistics are also shown in Table 1 . Note that education expenditures are mainly made by local governments, so the education expenditure data measures intergovernmental transfers from the state to local governments targeted solely to education. Transportation expenditure comprises the general expenditure functions of highways, air transportation, parking facilities, and so on. There are many missing values in the sub-categories of air transportation and parking facilities, and highway expenditure is the largest share among transportation expenditure. Thus, highway expenditure is used to proxy for transportation expenditure. Health expenditure incorporates health and hospital services, whereas welfare expenditure includes all state spending for support of and assistance to needy. In the sample period, education accounts for around 20.5% the general expenditure 11 , welfare has a 20.9% share, health has a 7.6% share, and highways 10%. In addition, since security and safety are important standards used by the public to evaluate the government, correction 12 and security 13 expenditures are included as a separate category.
In the sample, thirty-two out of forty-six states hold the gubernatorial election at the same time as the midterm elections (in the years 1978, 1982, 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002 and 2006 in the sample periods). With a plot of the average public spending for these thirty-two states (Figure 1 ), some eyeball impressions of public spending composition across types of fiscal rules are made. The vertical lines highlight the years when the elections were held. In general, states with carry-over rules spend more than states without carry-over rules. Correction expenditures 8 The divided government dummy is coded as 1 when different parties control any two of the three government components (the governor, the state house and the state senate) and is coded as 0 when there is unified government, where the same party controls for all three government components. Note that Nebraska is the only state with a unicameral and nonpartisan legislature, where the senators are elected with no party affiliation. So, traditionally Nebraska is not counted as a divided government, and is coded as 0 accordingly.
9 Democratic governor is a dummy variable to capture the governor's party affiliation. 10 A governor is a lame duck, when he/she is in the last term of office. 11 General expenditure is used instead of total expenditure because the legal constraints of states balanced budget requirements only bind on the states' general revenues and expenditures. Even though the definition of the general funds may be somewhat different across states, the U.S. Census Bureau defines general expenditure as all government expenditure other than four categories: utility expenditure, liquor store expenditure, and employee-retirement and insurance trust expenditure.
12 This function includes expenditures on pardon, probation and parole activities, and spending on all stateoperated facilities, such as state prisons, reformatories and state institutions for the correction of convicted persons and juveniles. 13 Security expenditures include two primary sub-categories: police protection and protective regulation. The former aims to strengthen public security and traffic safety, and the latter aims to regulate private enterprise for the protection of the public. for the states with carry-over fiscal rules and the states with weak no carry-over fiscal rules appear to increase during election years, but such effects are less apparent for states with stringent no carry-over fiscal rules. Also, the states with carry-over fiscal rules appear to increase their security and welfare expenditures slightly during the election year. Other categories do not show apparent differences between election year and non-election years.
Methodology
The purpose of this paper is to test the effect of electoral cycles on public spending composition under different fiscal rules. So, the first hypothesis is that politicians will manipulate public expenditure prior to gubernatorial elections in order to increase vote shares. Such an effect may be more prominent in states with more stringent fiscal rules. The baseline model is as follows:
The dependent variable is spending in a particular category in state i in year t, measured in millions of 1980 dollars. To account for the persistence of spending, a lagged dependent variable appears on the right-hand side. In the baseline regression, an electoral year dummy (election it ) and the interaction between election year and the ACIR index (election it * ACIR it ) are the primary independent variables. Finally, X it is a vector of control variables. Among them are structural and demographic variables, such as population, share of the population under 17, share of the population above 65, personal income, the unemployment rate, divided government, intergovernmental transfers from the federal government 14 and the lagged interest 14 The federal government only transfers money to state governments for the four major categories mentioned expenditure on the general debt. Furthermore, the regression includes state fixed effects (α i ) and year effects (year t ), and it is a disturbance term that may be correlated across years.
Including a lagged dependent variable may introduce a potential bias as it violates the strict exogeneity requirement that independent variables should be uncorrelated with the error term. The resulting estimation bias is given by the inverse of the length of the sample period, 1 T , and such bias cannot be ignored even if the number of states is large (Nickell 1981 , Wooldridge 2002 ). The standard method of dealing with this issue is to apply the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator developed for dynamic panel-data models. Arellano and Bond's previously (education, health, highway and welfare), so control for this variable is unneeded in the regression for security and correction expenditure.
(1991) estimation strategy is, firstly, to remove the individual fix-effects by taking the firstdifferences, and then to apply an instrumental variables approach using appropriately lagged levels of the variables, uncorrelated with the fixed effects, to instrument for the lagged dependent variable. When employing the GMM estimator, a crucial assumption is that the instruments are exogenous. The validity of subsets of instruments is appraised using the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions under the null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the errors in the first-difference equation. A test for second-order serial correlation in the first-difference residuals is carried out as well. The model is also evaluated by performing the Wald statistic test of the null hypothesis that all coefficients are jointly equal to zero. Table 2 reports the results of the baseline regressions. The coefficients of interest are those for the election year dummy and for the interaction term between election year and the ACIR index. The categories with significant effects are corrections, education, highway, welfare and security. The coefficient on "election year" indicates a public spending change for a state with the ACIR index 0, a state with almost no fiscal restriction, whereas the coefficient on "election year*ACIR index" represents how much more government spends during an election year if the ACIR index is one unit more stringent.
Results
Since the election year effect depends on the level of the ACIR index, the effect is computed for different index levels, and a test for a nonzero value is carried out. The mean of the ACIR index for states with carry-over rules is 5.94, 9.84 for states with weak no carry-over rules and 9.94 for states with stringent no carry-over rules. Using these mean values, the election-year effects are computed and significance tests carried out, with the results presented in Table 2 . Table 2 suggests that politicians are likely to increase corrections, security, welfare spending, but decrease education spending prior to the election. 15 Such effects are significant for states with carry-over fiscal rules, and are less apparent as the stringency of fiscal rules increases.
For correction and security expenditures, during the election year on average states with carry-over rules increase these expenditure by 7.83 and 6.21 million 1980 dollars respectively. States with weak no carry-over rules increase correction expenditure by 3.43 million dollars and states with stringent no carry-over rules increase correction expenditure by 3.31 million dollars, but such effects are not significant for security spending. There are a few possible reasons for the link between gubernatorial elections and changes in correction and security spending. First, since crime consistently is one of the major social issues for the public in opinion surveys, politicians have an incentive to strengthen public security prior to the election, either in hopes of reducing the crime rate or simply demonstrating that they take the crime problem seriously. Secondly, political considerations sometimes play a role in determining the timing of inmate executions, a costly enterprise. Prior to the election, state governments are more likely to speed 15 Highway expenditure is the only anomaly in the sense that the effect of political budget cycles is significant in states with no carry-over fiscal rules, but insignificant in states with carry-over fiscal rules. From Table 2 , during the election year, states with weak and stringent no carry-over rules increase spending by 12.64 and 12.69 million dollars respectively. However, the coefficients on election year and the interaction term between election year and the ACIR index are not significant. The effects may mainly come from the ACIR index, not from the electoral cycles, so they will not be emphasized in the following discussion.
up executions not only to show their efficiency and effectiveness but also to curb crime rates. Kubik and Moran (2002) analyzed data from 1977 to 2000 and found that states are 25 percent more likely to conduct executions in gubernatorial election years than in other years. Such an anomaly during the gubernatorial election may also be accompanied by an increase in correction expenditure. Table 2 also suggests that states with carry-over rules on average increase welfare expenditure by 26.09 million dollars. However, the stringency of fiscal rules completely dampens the effect of political budget cycles; such effects are not significant in states with no carry-over rules. This finding somewhat matches the prediction of the signaling model that politicians have more incentive to increase spending on projects which are more visible to the voters prior to elections. Welfare expenditures, which are more visible to the public, can provide immediate economic benefit to needy persons in exchange for not only political reputation but also political support.
In Table 2 , a decrease in education expenditure is also observed. States with carry-over rules on average decrease education expenditure by 45.03 million dollars. This result is somewhat surprising. Because the majority of adults have children or family members enrolled in elementary or secondary school, education should be a major concern for the public. This notion is consistent with the fact that education is one of the largest categories of public spending. Yet, the results show that politicians tend to reduce education expenditure during election years. A possible explanation is that education expenditures (operation of public schools, construction of school buildings, and all the services associated with educational institutions) are less visible than other expenditure categories, such as security and welfare. Thus, it may be more difficult for the public to observe the consequences of increases or decreases in education expenditure. Another possibility is that politicians reduce education expenditure strategically so as to minimize the observable short-run consequences. For instance, instead of closing schools altogether, they may reduce expenditures assigned to materials or new facilities, thus reducing the observability of the reductions in spending. Therefore, to maximize the chances of being reelected, politicians have an incentive to reduce education expenditure at the margin and shift it to more salient categories. Finally, even if people care about education, most of their understanding about it is shaped by mass media and memories of their own experiences, which occurred a long time ago. If there is insufficient news coverage, it is difficult for the public to recognize the stakes related to reductions in education. This seems to be the case in the U.S. According to a report issued by the Brookings Institution in 2009, in 2007, only 1.0 percent of national news coverage was related to education issues, and this percentage dropped to 0.7 in 2008, showing that education issues get little attention in the mass media, even in election years. 16 To sum up, the findings show that, prior to the election, politicians shift public spending toward more salient projects, such as corrections, security and welfare, and away from relatively less salient projects, such as education, to increase electoral gain. Yet, different from the previous conjectures, such effects are more prominent in states with carry-over fiscal rules than in states 16 Education issues, such as K-12 policy, have received more attention since the 2010 midterm election, perhaps because people were struggling during an economic downturn and attributed high unemployment rate to educational failure. Yet the sample period in this paper is from 1977 to 2008, when education issues were usually not broadly discussed during an election. Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * * * significant at 1% level, * * significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level with no carry-over fiscal rules. The results may show that in states with no carry-over fiscal rules, politicians not only face a constraint on manipulating the aggregate budget but also may have little discretion to shift spending across different categories.
Political Institutions
To validate that the results are robust, the possibility that identification comes from the other differences between the states with and without carry-over rules must be discussed. It is possible that states with the same fiscal rules share similar political institutions or other characteristics that are unobservable and result in different policy preferences of the state government. Hibb's partisan approach (1977) provides a way of ruling out such possibilities. Hibb suggests that Democratic and Republic governors would have distinct preferences on public expenditure composition prior to the elections. As a result, African Americans, Latinos, gays and lesbians, young voters and union members are more likely to support the Democratic party whereas Caucasian and business people are more likely to vote Republican. Democratic governors would prefer to spend more on welfare and education than Republican governors prior to the election, and this difference may affect electoral cycles. By adding the Democratic governor dummy and the interaction term between Democratic governor and election year to the baseline regression model, the election year effect depends not only on the level of the ACIR index, but also the Democratic governor dummy. The coefficients Standard errors are in parentheses. * * * significant at 1% level, * * significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level of interest are those for the interaction term between election year and the Democratic governor dummy. The election year effects on spending in the presence of a Democratic governor and a non-Democratic governor are computed respectively for different ACIR index levels, and the results are reported in Table 3. From Table 3 , all the coefficients of the interaction term between election year and the Democratic governor dummy are insignificant. The mostly significant effects of political budget cycles on corrections, education, security and welfare expenditure for states with carry-over rules (shown in the first row of the two bottom panels) are driven by the effects of election years and fiscal rules, but not by Democratic governors. Thus, the effects of party affiliation on the electoral cycles are trivial. In addition, it is worth mentioning that as predicted, due to a different constituency composition, Democratic governors, compared to nonDemocratic governors, spend more on welfare, as shown by the significant dummy coefficient in the top panel. Column 6 of Table 3 suggests that a Democratic governor on average spends 48.59 million dollars more on welfare than a non-Democratic governor. The presence of a Democratic governor shifts welfare expenditure up by the same amounts in both election and non-election years, but it does not appear to affect the magnitude of the political budget cycles.
The other political institution of interest is the presence of gubernatorial term limits. Governors who are planning or are able to run for reelection care more about their reputations and have a higher incentive to target projects to fulfill the needs of their constituency (Besley and Case 1995) . So, the pre-election fiscal manipulation of governors who do not face term limits may be consistent with the prediction of the targeting model. A term limits dummy and the interaction term between term limits and election year are added to the baseline regression model. As in the previous analysis, the election year effects under control of a lame duck Standard errors are in parentheses. * * * significant at 1% level, * * significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level are computed for different ACIR index levels, and the results are reported in Table 4 . The coefficients of interest are those for the interaction term between election year and the term limits dummy. The overall election year effect depends not only on the level of the ACIR index, but also the term limits dummy.
From column 3 of Table 4 , compared to governors not facing term limits, during the election year governors facing term limits decrease health expenditure by 18.31 million dollars. However, such effects are dampened by the insignificant effects of election years and fiscal rules, so that none of states show prominent effects of political budget cycles on health expenditure (see the bottom two panels). Aside from health expenditure, all the coefficients of the interaction terms between election year and term limits are insignificant. This insignificance makes the overall election effect with term limits (shown in the second to last panel) insignificant for all spending categories. However, the overall effects are significant in some cases (matching previous results) when the governor does not face term limits. While the implication to be drawn from the bottom panels thus seems ambiguous, a clearer picture comes from just focusing on the term limit interaction coefficient in the top panel. Its insignificance in all but one case suggests that term limits have little effect on the electoral cycle. trend in enacting more stringent fiscal rules to impose constraints on the discretion of politicians. This paper contributes to the existing literature by linking balanced budget rules to politicians' opportunistic behavior over the electoral cycle. Data from forty-six American states show that public spending composition exhibits a political budget cycle in states with carry-over fiscal rules, whereas states with no carry-over fiscal rules show no cycle. The effects of the electoral cycle are dampened by the stringency of the fiscal rules. Thus, we would expect that, with more countries by enacting balanced budget requirements, politicians would be less likely to manipulate public spending for electoral gain, so that the electoral cycles may be less significant. The paper's results somewhat conform to the signaling-theory prediction that politicians facing an election are likely to shift public spending towards more salient projects and away from less salient projects. So, prior to elections, politicians increase public spending on corrections, security and welfare, but decrease education expenditure. Such effects are only significant in the states with carry-over fiscal rules and slightly affected by party affiliation and term limits. The lesson is that, without considering the balanced budget requirement, the effects of political budget cycles may be overstated.
